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WHAT WERE THEY SMOKING?: THE
SUPREME COURT'S LATEST STEP IN A
LONG, STRANGE TRIP THROUGH THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kyllo v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether the use of a thermal imager, which detects the pat-
terns of heat escaping from a house, constitutes a search and requires
a warrant under the Fourth Amendment . The Court held that
"[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."3 The
Court based its holding on its belief that the technology employed
gave investigators information about the inside of Kyllo's home that
they would not otherwise have been able to get without a physical in-
vasion,4 and that the technology used is not in wide use.'
This note examines the history of the Court's approach to tech-
nology and the Fourth Amendment. Physical encroachment without
a warrant is a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment.6 As technol-
ogy has advanced, the government has been able to gain information
that it previously would not have been able to obtain without physi-
cally encroaching on the defendant's property. Because of the gov-
ernment's constantly advancing technological abilities, the Court has
1 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 40.
4 Id. at 34.
5 id.
6 See discussion infra Parts 11. A-B.
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struggled to provide a clear answer to what is and what is not allowed
under the Fourth Amendment. This note argues that the Court
wrongly decided Kyllo v. United States based on its fear about what
future technology will allow the government to do and out of frustra-
tion with its own confused past regarding this issue, which is filled
with numerous cases that probably should have been decided differ-
ently. Instead, the Court should have confined its holding to the
technology that was before it and established a test that would have
been easy to apply in future cases as technology develops.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
7
The Fourth Amendment was the direct result of the colonists' experi-
ence with the British writs of assistance.8 "In order to enforce the
revenue laws, English authorities made use of writs of assistance...
authorizing the bearer to enter any house or other place to search for
and seize 'prohibited and uncustomed' goods, and commanding all
subjects to assist in these endeavors."9 Once issued, the writs lasted
for "the lifetime of the sovereign and six months thereafter."'" The
insistence on freedom from the intrusions of unreasonable "searches
and seizures" came late to the colonies." However, it was deeply
rooted in "a maxim much celebrated in England" that "[e]very man's
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Fourth Amendment -
Search and Seizure, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION, ANNOTATIONS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES TO JUNE 29, 1992, S. DoC. No. 103-6, at Fourth Amendment, Search and Sei-
zure 1199 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1996), available at
http://www.acccss.gpo.gov/congress/senate/constitution/conO 15.pdf (last updated Sept. 27,
2002).
9 Id. at 1200.
0 Id.
1 Id. at 1199; see also Matthew L. Zabel, Comment, A High-Tech Assault on the "Cas-
tle ": Warrantless Thermal Surveillance of Private Residences and the Fourth Amendment,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 267, 271 (1995).
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house is his castle., 12
The Fourth Amendment only applies to "searches" and "sei-
zures."13 In order for a defendant to have evidence suppressed based
on a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the defendant must show
that either a search or seizure has occurred. 4 Under the common
law, there was no doubt about what constituted a search: physical in-
vasion of a property interest. 5 As will be seen below, a physical in-
vasion of the home was the factor that the Court depended on to de-
termine whether there was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes
up until 1967.16 Then, in Katz v. United States,7 the Court issued an
opinion that appeared to greatly enhance Fourth Amendment protec-
tions as it completely changed how the use of technology in investi-
gations was analyzed. Instead of basing its analysis on whether there
was a physical encroachment of a constitutionally protected area, the
Katz holding was based on whether the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.' 8 However, as will be demonstrated below,
the practical effect of this opinion appears to have been substantially
less than what it was probably assumed it would be at the time of its
issuing.
B. PRE-KATZ FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES INVOLVING THE USE OF
TECHNOLOGY
19
One of the earliest cases to raise the issue of the Fourth Amend-
ment as it applied to an investigation that did not involve physical
trespass onto the defendant's property was Olmstead v. United
States."° The issue in Olmstead was whether evidence collected
through phone taps that had been installed without trespass on the de-
fendant's property violated the Fourth Amendment.2' In holding that
12 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 8, at 1199 (citing Semayne's Case, 5
Coke's Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604)).
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14 Zabel, supra note I1, at 273.
15 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 8, at 1205.
16 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Il 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
IS Id. at 347.
19 Breaking down the cases between pre-Katz and post-Katz cases was also done in Za-
bel, supra note 11, at 271.
20 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
21 Id. at 457.
20021
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a wiretap was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
stated that the well-known purpose of the Fourth Amendment "was
to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man's house, his
person, his papers and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against
his will."22 The Court limited the Fourth Amendment protections to
searches involving "material things. 2 3 The Court also noted that a
person installs a telephone with the purpose of projecting his voice
outside of his home, implying that if this had not been the case, per-
haps the defendant would have prevailed. 4
Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead bears a strong resem-
blance to the line of reasoning that the Court has adopted in Kyllo.25
He argued that, when applying the Constitution, it is important to not
only consider what has been, but what may be." When the Fourth
Amendment was adopted, the ways for the government to invade
someone's privacy were necessarily simple. 7 As technology ad-
vances, however, "[s]ubtler and far-reaching means of invading pri-
vacy" will be developed.28
Fourteen years after Olmstead, the Supreme Court decided
Goldman v. United States.29 Goldman allowed investigators further
latitude in what they could do without violating the Fourth Amend-
ment. In Goldman, federal investigators had placed against the wall
of an adjoining office a microphone that was so sensitive that it could
pick up conversations taking place in the office on the other side of
the wall.3" As in Olmstead, the Court held that eavesdropping was
not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It then went further and
removed the only limitation on non-physical searches that it had ap-
peared to erect in Olmstead-that the police were limited to monitor-
ing information that the defendant intentionally projected beyond the
walls of his house.3 The petitioner argued that this case should be
distinguished from Olmstead because the defendant here was not in-
22 Id. at 463.
23 Id. at 464.
24 Id. at 466.
25 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
28 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
30 Id. at 131.
3' Id. at 129; see Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
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tentionally projecting his voice beyond the confines of the office that
was being surveyed.32 The Court rejected this argument, saying only
that "the distinction is too nice for practical application of the Consti-
tutional guarantee, and no reasonable or logical distinction can be
drawn between what federal agents did in the present case and state
officers did in the Olmstead case.""
In its next major case involving the Fourth Amendment and
technology, Silverman v. United States,34 the Court did rule in favor
of the defendant, holding that the attachment of a microphone to a
heating duct in the defendant's house violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.3" However, its reasoning did not expand the protections avail-
able to the subjects of police investigations as it rested its decision on
the fact that the police had physically encroached on the defendant's
property to gather information.36 The Court explicitly distinguished
this case from Goldman, stating that, unlike in Goldman, the police
accomplished their eavesdropping "by means of an unauthorized
physical encroachment within a constitutionally protected area."37 At
this point, it was clear that there were few, if any, limits on what gov-
ernment agents could do if they could avoid a physical encroachment
on the defendant's property.
C. KATZ V. UNITED STATES: A TURNING POINT FOR TECHNOLOGY
AND FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW?
What was originally thought to be a turning point for Fourth
Amendment law came in 1967 when the Court decided Katz v.
United States.38 Up until this time, the Court had only found searches
to violate the Fourth Amendment when a physical encroachment on
the defendant's property had occurred.39 In Katz, the Court explicitly
announced that physical encroachment was no longer a deciding fac-
tor in determining whether a Fourth Amendment search had oc-
32 Goldman, 316 U.S. at 135.
33 id.
3' 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
" Id. at 505.
36 Id. at 509.
31 Id. at 510.
38 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39 See, e.g., Silverman, 365 U.S. 505. Cf Goldman, 316 U.S. 129; Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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curred. ° FBI agents had attached a microphone to the outside of a
phone booth that the agents believed the defendant was using to place
illegal bets.' The Court dramatically overruled its previous cases,
stating that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places."42 It
further stated that, while physical penetration of a protected area was
once thought important to Fourth Amendment analysis, it had ex-
pressly held that the Fourth Amendment applies not only to cases
where tangible property has been invaded, but also to statements that
have been recorded without any physical trespass.43
The most enduring portion of the Katz decision came not from
the majority opinion, but from a concurring opinion by Justice
Harlan. In his opinion, Justice Harlan outlined a two-part test that he
believed the Court was relying on to determine whether there was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment." The first part of the test is to
determine whether the subject of the search exhibits a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy." If he does, the Court must then decide
whether that expectation of privacy is one that society would find
reasonable.46 This two-part test has been employed regularly in cases
since Katz, particularly those that involve the use of technology by
the investigators.47
Perhaps not surprisingly, there was a dissent in the Katz case ob-
jecting to the application of the Fourth Amendment to a fact pattern
that a literal interpretation of the Amendment's words would not
cover." In that dissent, Justice Black argued that the words of the
Fourth Amendment only cover tangible items. 49 Furthermore, Justice
Black argued that the Fourth Amendment only covers items that can
be described (for purposes of securing a warrant), while a conversa-
40 Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
41 Id. at 348.
42 Id. at 351.
43 Id. at 353. The Supreme Court cites Silverman in support of its proposition that there
need not be a physical invasion of property in order for a Fourth Amendment violation to
occur. This appears to be a misrepresentation of Silverman, as that case did involve a physi-
cal trespass, and the Supreme Court explicitly mentioned that as being an important reason
for why the search in question violated the Fourth Amendment.
44 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring)..
46 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
47 See discussion infra Part lI.D.
41 Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting).
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tion cannot be described before it occurs.50
Justice Black then took issue with the majority's application of
the Fourth Amendment to Katz's case, arguing that it does not fit
with what could have been the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." According to Black, eavesdropping was common at
the time that the Fourth Amendment was adopted. 2 The Fourth
Amendment was aimed at stopping breaking, entering, and ransack-
ing-not eavesdropping.53  With this decision, Black argued, the
Court had mistakenly reinterpreted the Fourth Amendment as protect-
ing privacy rather than protecting against unreasonable searches.54
D. POST-KATZ FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES INVOLVING THE USE OF
TECHNOLOGY
Since Katz, the Supreme Court has consistently applied what has
become known as the Katz test (the two-part test outlined in Justice
Harlan's concurrence) to determine whether the use of technology by
government officials in criminal investigations violates the Fourth
Amendment. 5 However, while the Court's reasoning in Fourth
Amendment cases has changed since Katz, its frequent siding with
law enforcement has not.56 Indeed, Katz appears to have been an ex-
tremely short-lived, high-water mark for Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.5
7
The Court's first post-Katz analysis came when it decided Smith
v. Maryland" in 1979. At issue was whether the warrantless re-
cording of phone numbers that the defendant had dialed from his
50 Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting).
52 Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 367 (Black, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
(1988); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207 (1986); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276 (1983); Smith v. Maryland., 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
56 See, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35; Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. 227; Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207; Knotts, 460 U.S. 276; Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
57 See Jonathan Todd Laba, Comment, If You Can't Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Drug
Business: Thermal Imagers, Emerging Technologies, and the Fourth Amendment, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1437, 1444 (1996).
" 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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house violated the Fourth Amendment.5 9 The Court held that, be-
cause the defendant was voluntarily turning the numbers over to a
third party (the phone company), he had not exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy" and, even if he had, it was not one that soci-
ety would see as reasonable.6 Because its fact pattern is similar to
that in Olmstead, this case provides an excellent opportunity to see
how Katz changed the landscape of Fourth Amendment cases involv-
ing the use of technology.62 In both cases, the investigators inter-
cepted information after it had left the suspects' homes via the tele-
phone.63 However, in Olmstead, the Court upheld the wiretap
because there was no physical invasion.64 In contrast, the Court in
Smith v. Maryland upheld the recording of dialed phone numbers be-
cause the defendant had not exhibited an expectation of privacy.65
Although the result was the same in both cases, the reasoning used in
Olmstead would have a much narrower application than that em-
ployed in Smith.6 6 The Olmstead reasoning would only protect peo-
ple from physical encroachments on their property, whereas the rea-
soning employed in Smith (as borrowed from Katz) protects people in
any situation where they have a reasonable belief that what they are
doing is being conducted in privacy.67
After Smith, it was difficult to tell what practical effect Katz had
had for defendants.68 On the one hand, Katz had clearly extended
Fourth Amendment protections beyond the walls of the home or of-
fice to anywhere that the defendant expected privacy that society
would find reasonable. 69  However, Smith indicated the possibility
that the defendant was going to have to do more than just expect pri-
vacy.7" He was going to have to give an outward signal of his expec-
tation.7' A clearer indication of the direction of Fourth Amendment
" Id. at 737.
60 Id. at 742.
61 Id. at 743.
62 Compare Smith, 442 U.S. 735, with Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
63 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457; Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
64 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
61 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
66 Compare Smith, 442 U.S. 735, with Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438.
67 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
68 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
69 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
70 See Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
71 id.
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protections came four years later in United States v. Knotts, 72 in
which the Supreme Court once again upheld the constitutionality of a
criminal investigation that employed technology, based on the Katz
test.73 After being tipped off to the fact that the defendant was buying
large amounts of chemicals known to be used in drug manufacturing,
narcotics officers placed a beeper (a device that emits a radio signal
that officers can use to identify its location) into a barrel of the
chemicals that was eventually sold to one of the defendant's friends.74
The officers used the beeper to track where the chemicals were
taken.75 The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the beeper,
but the Court upheld its use based on the Katz test.76 The Court rea-
soned that a person who travels on public thoroughfares does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.77 The officers could have
seen the information that the beeper gave them with naked-eye sur-
veillance and the fact that they relied on a beeper to assist them did
not alter the situation. 8
Three months later, law enforcement officers claimed another
victory when the Supreme Court decided United States v. Place,79 a
case which has often played a central role in lower courts' decisions
of thermal imager cases.8" In this case, police detained the defen-
dant's luggage, based on what the Court agreed was a "reasonable be-
lief' that he was carrying narcotics, and subjected the luggage to a
sniff test by a drug-detecting dog.8 The Court dealt with two issues
in this case. First, it held that "when an officer's observations lead
him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that con-
tains narcotics," the officer is permitted to detain the luggage briefly
to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion. s2 Second,
the Court considered whether exposure of the luggage to a narcotics
72 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
" Id. at 285.
14 Id. at 278.
75 id.
76 Id. at 285.
77 Id. at 281.
78 Id. at 282.
79 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
80 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (1 1th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Penny-Feeny, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991).
81 Place, 462 U.S. at 703.
2 Id. at 706.
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detection dog violated the Fourth Amendment.83 The Court held that,
although it had previously determined that people have a privacy in-
terest in the contents of their luggage that is protected by the Fourth
Amendment, this privacy interest was not violated by a "canine
sniff." 4 The Court reasoned that a "canine sniff' does not require
opening the luggage and it does not expose non-contraband items.85
So, although the sniff does tell the officers something about the con-
tents of the luggage, the information potentially gained is limited.86
In a brief respite from its continued degradation of Fourth
Amendment protections, the Supreme Court finally used the Katz test
to declare the use of technology unconstitutional in United States v.
Karo.87 The result of this case is surprising because the fact pattern is
almost identical to that presented in the Knotts case, which had been
decided the other way only a year earlier.8 Similar to Knotts, a Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent in Karo placed a beeper in a can
of chemicals with the intent to sell it to the defendant so that he could
track the defendant's movements after he learned that the defendant
had ordered large amounts of chemicals that are known to be used in
drug manufacturing.89 As in Knotts, the officers in Karo then used
the beeper and visual surveillance to follow the defendant to his
house as he drove over public roads.9" However, according to the
Court, the critical fact difference between this case and Knotts was
that the officers continued to monitor the beeper after it was taken
into a home and they later used it to help them determine that it had
been moved to a different home.9 In Knotts, the officers had stopped
tracking the beeper after it was taken into the home.92 The Court rea-
soned that, although using a beeper is less intrusive than a physical
search which would reveal critical details about the inside of a house,
it could not be allowed.93
83 Id.
84 Id. at 707.
85 Id.
86 Id.
17 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
88 Compare Karo, 468 U.S. 705, with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
'9 Karo, 468 U.S. at 708. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (describing the
Knotts case).
90 Karo, 468 U.S. at 708. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
9' Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
92 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278-79.
93 Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
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The Court quickly reverted back to approving potentially
invasive investigative police tactics when it decided California v.
Ciraolo.94 After receiving an anonymous tip that the defendant was
growing marijuana in his backyard, police flew over the yard in an
airplane at 1000 feet with experts trained to identify marijuana.95 The
police were forced to fly over the yard because the defendant had
erected a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence around it,
preventing people from viewing the yard at ground level.96 The Court
held that this was a sufficient manifestation of an expectation of pri-
vacy on the defendant's part.97 However, the Court felt that this
expectation of privacy was not one that society would find reasonable
and, therefore, the defendant had failed the second prong of the Katz
test.98 The Court reasoned that any member of the public flying over
the house could have glanced down and seen what the officers had
seen.99 This case was one of the most invasive investigations that the
Court had upheld as not violating the Fourth Amendment since Katz.
The dissent pointed out that photographs taken of the backyard dur-
ing the fly-over revealed not just marijuana but also a swimming
pool and a patio.' 0 The dissent also pointed out that the technology
used (specifically, the airplane) allowed police officers to conduct the
investigation in a way that only would have been possible with
physical invasions at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted."'
The same day that Ciraolo was decided, the Court decided Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, °2 in which it upheld the use of the
most sophisticated technology to be challenged since Katz.'0 3 This
case involved another fly-over and photographing by investigators at
heights of 12,000 feet, 3000 feet, and 1200 feet.0 4 However, in this
case, the airplane and the camera were significantly more sophisti-
cated than those used by the general public.0 5 The aircraft used by
14 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
9' Id. at 209.
96 Id.
9' ld. at 211.
98 Id. at 214.
9' Id. at 213-14.
100 Id. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting).
'01 Id. at 222 (Powell, J., dissenting).
102 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
'o' Id. at 238-39.
104 Id. at 229.
"' Id. at 242 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the investigators was designed to provide stability for purposes of
shooting overhead photographs."°6 The camera was a $22,000 cam-
era designed for mapmakers, and described by its maker as the "finest
precision aerial camera available."'0 7  The camera was capable of
stereoscopic examination, which allows for depth perception.0 8 Pho-
tographs taken from 1200 feet using this camera could be enlarged to
a scale of one-inch equals twenty-feet, without any significant loss
in resolution or detail.0 9 The district court concluded that the tech-
nology employed here allowed investigators to see details that they
would not have been able to see otherwise unless they were directly
above the facilities being observed."0  However, the Court down-
played the significance of the technology involved here, referring to
it as "a conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera..'' The
Court then went on to clarify why this technology is acceptable by
comparing it to a technology that would not be permissible-but only
confused the situation further." 2 The Court stated that "highly so-
phisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the pub-
lic, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed
absent a warrant. But the photographs here are not so revealing of in-
timate details as to raise constitutional concerns.""' 3 However, there
is no intelligible reason for distinguishing between the photographs
taken by the camera used in this case and those taken by a satellite." 4
If anything, the technology employed by investigators in Dow
Chemical would be more likely to reveal intimate details than the po-
tentially proscribed satellite technology that the Court distinguishes it
from." ' One is left to wonder if Dow could have done anything to
protect itself from an overhead search." 6 The company had taken
elaborate steps to guard its security, erecting a substantial and sophis-
06 Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
07 Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'o' Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109 Id. at 243 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).




114 Id. at 244 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he Court relies
on questionable assertions concerning the manner of the surveillance .... ").
' See id. at 243 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116 Id. at 241; Laba, supra note 57, at 1460.
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ticated security system.' 7 It even took steps to prevent the exact kind
of search that investigators employed in this instance, tracking down
planes that had flown overhead and confiscating any pictures that
were taken of its plant."8 However, because the Court was unim-
pressed with the quality of technology employed in this case, Dow's
efforts were all for naught." 9
Unfortunately, despite its confusing reasoning, Dow Chemical
has become a frequently cited case in Fourth Amendment challenges
involving technology. 2 ' While the discussion of technology in this
case was confusing, courts have relied on Dow Chemical for the
proposition that conducting investigations from the air over a house is
constitutionally permissible 2 ' and for the proposition that the area
surrounding a home, as compared to that surrounding a commercial
complex, enjoys heightened protection.' The Court made a point of
mentioning in Dow Chemical that it found it important that the inves-
tigation did not involve an area adjacent to a home, where privacy
concerns are most heightened.'23 Furthermore, the Court noted that
Dow had made no efforts to conceal its operations from the air,2 4 al-
though it appears that the size of the plan made this impossible.'
Two years later, the Supreme Court again upheld the constitu-
tionality of a search that seemed to push the boundaries of Fourth
Amendment rights when it decided California v. Greenwood."6 Act-
ing on information that the defendants were involved in narcotics
trafficking, police twice obtained the defendant's garbage from gar-
bage collectors.'27 Based on evidence that they collected from the
garbage, police obtained a warrant to search the defendant's home,
117 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 229.
'" Id. at 241-42 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
''9 Id. at 231.
120 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 460 n.3 (1989); United States v. Cusumano,
67 F.3d 1497, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11 th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11 th Cir. 1994); United States v. Field,
855 F. Supp. 1518, 1529 (W.D. Wis. 1994); United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp.
1460, 1473 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
121 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
122 See, e.g., Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1529.
123 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986).
124 Id.
125 Laba, supra note 57, at 1460.
126 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
127 Id. at 37-38.
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which resulted in more evidence of narcotics trafficking.12 The trial
court dismissed the charges against the defendant, holding that the
warrantless search of garbage violated state law.129 However, the
case that the trial court drew its authority from also held that war-
rantless trash searches violated federal law. 3' After the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the lower court's decision, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed.'
The Court relied on the Katz test to arrive at its conclusion, hold-
ing that a person who leaves his garbage on the side of a public street
does not manifest a reasonable expectation in its privacy.'32 The
Court reasoned that, because garbage left on a street is easily accessi-
ble to anyone'33 and because police are not required to avert their
eyes to avoid seeing something that has been left in plain view,'34
searching garbage without a warrant does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 3 The dissent made the point that searching through
someone's garbage is likely to reveal intimate details beyond any
criminal activity about what is going on inside the house that pro-
duced it-perhaps more details than an actual, physical search of the
house would.'36 If this is true, it would appear to be a substantial ex-
pansion of the limitations on warrantless searches identified in
Place.'37 In that case, the Court had stated that it was important that
the permitted "canine sniff' would not reveal non-contraband
items. 3
E. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THERMAL
SCANS
Nearly all federal district, appellate and state courts that have
dealt with the issue of whether use of a thermal scanner constitutes a
28 Id. at 38.
129 Id.
130 Id. (citing People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971)).
i" Id. at 39.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 40.
... Id. at 41.
13 Id. at 44-45.
136 Id. at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
.38 Id. at 707.
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search have held that it does not. 39 The courts have relied on a large
range of reasoning to arrive at their conclusions. The Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have held that the use of a thermal detector without a
warrant is constitutional because the detection of heat emanating
from a house is similar to the detection of odors emanating from lug-
gage, which has been held to be constitutional.14 ° The Eighth Circuit
also reasoned that because the heat coming off of a house is waste
that is being discarded from the house, it is similar to garbage and be-
cause searching garbage has been held to be constitutional, detection
of heat is as well.14' The Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits have re-
lied on the Katz test and held that because the defendant did not take
affirmative action to prevent heat from leaving his house, he did not
139 See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (1 lthCir. 1995) (holding that a private
homeowner who did not take any affirmative action to prevent the heat from his marijuana
growing operation from emitting from his house had not exhibited a subjective expectation
of privacy); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that because a
thermal scanner does not reveal any intimate details inside the structure being scanned, its
warrantless use is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d
668 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that because the defendant not only did not take affirmative
steps to prevent heat from leaving his house, but actually vented the heat from his house, he
had not manifested a subjective expectation of privacy); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992
(1 Ith Cir. 1994) (holding that because the defendant had not exhibited either a subjective or
objective expectation of privacy in heat vented from his mobile home, thermal imagery did
not constitute an impermissible search); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding that detection of heat emanating from a house is analogous to detection of
odors emanating from luggage or the search of garbage left outside for collection and there-
fore does not require a warrant); United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460 (E.D.
Wash. 1994) (holding that because the defendant had knowingly exposed vapors and heat to
public observation, he could not claim an actual expectation of privacy in the heat emanating
from his marijuana growing operation); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220
(D. Haw. 1991) (holding that because the defendants had voluntarily vented heat from their
garage, they had not manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in it).
But see United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995), vacatedby 83 F.3d 1247
(1996) (holding that because a thermal scanner not only tells its user that heat is coming off
of a home, but also tells its user the pattern in which that heat is coming off of the home, it
reveals intimate details about the inside of the house being scanned and is therefore a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994)
(holding that because there is nothing a homeowner can do to stop heat from leaving his
house, and because a thermal imager reveals the general location of heat-producing items
behind a wall, it constitutes a search); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gindlesperger, 743
A.2d 898 (Pa. 1999) (holding that because the detection of heat emanating from a house can
potentially provide intimate details about what is going on inside the house, the use of a ther-
mal imager without a warrant is unconstitutional).
140 See Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056; United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Noonan, J., dissenting), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
141 Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59.
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manifest a subjective expectation of privacy; therefore, the courts
held that viewing that heat without a warrant was not a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. 4 ' As will be argued below, each of these
justifications for upholding the use of a thermal imager without a
warrant is misplaced.




One interesting fact about the Kyllo case is that Danny Lee Kyllo
was not the original target of the investigation that ultimately led him
to the Supreme Court-that target was a man by the name of Sam
Shook.' During their investigation of Mr. Shook, investigators
came to believe that his daughter, Tova Shook, was also involved in
the manufacturing and distribution of marijuana.'45 Mr. Kyllo hap-
pened to live next door to Ms. Shook and his estranged wife lived
with Ms. Shook.'46 The officer who initially became suspicious of
Mr. Kyllo was told erroneously that Mr. Kyllo lived with his wife,
and that she "had been arrested the month before for delivery and
possession of a controlled substance ... .""' He also learned that
Mr. Kyllo "had once told a police informant that he and [his wife]
could supply marijuana... ."," All of this led the officer to sub-
poena Mr. Kyllo's electrical usage records (which could be done
without a warrant)."' Upon comparing them to a spreadsheet that
was meant to show the level of electricity a house normally con-
sumes, the officer concluded that Mr. Kyllo's electricity usage was
abnormally high. 5°
The results of the preliminary investigation led the police agent
142 See Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325; Myers, 46 F.3d 668.
14' 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
144 United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1994).
145 Id.
146 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508).
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to believe that Mr. Kyllo was growing marijuana in his house."'
Based on this belief, the police officer and a member of the Oregon
National Guard conducted a thermal scan of the house.' The scan
showed an abnormally high amount of heat coming off of some areas
of the house.'53 Based on the thermal scan and the evidence that had
been collected before the scan, a search warrant was issued.15 4
2. The Technology
While the facts of the case are not in dispute, there is some in-
consistency regarding the capabilities of the thermal scanner used by
the investigators. Both the majority and dissenting opinions are in
agreement that the thermal scanner used on Kyllo's home measured
the heat being emitted from the outside of the walls of the house.'55
However, there appears to be little agreement on how much this tells
the officers about what is going on inside the home.
According to Mr. Kyllo, "thermal imaging is intended to, and
does, discern activity in the home"' 6 and a thermal detector "turn[s]
the walls of private homes into mere conduits of invisible informa-
tion.""' 5 However, others have offered a more benign view of what
thermal imagers are capable of, stating that they only tell the police
that there is a heat source inside of the home.' It appears that there
are a variety of thermal imagers available and while some are only
capable of providing crude images of where heat is coming from,
others have the capability to unveil more detail.'59
In this case, the trial court found that the thermal imager that the
police used "is a non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams
and shows a crude visual image of the heat being radiated from the
151 Id.
52 Id. at 1044.
153 id.
154 id.
155 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. at 35; Id. at 42-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Brief for Petitioner at 21, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508).
157 id.
158 See, e.g., Michael L. Huskins, Comment, Marijuana Hot Spots: Infrared Imaging and
the Fourth Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 661 (1996) ("Infrared imagers cannot pro-
duce an image of an object or person inside the interior of a home. Infrared imaging can only
indicate whether an enclosed structure contains a heat source, and from this information, po-
lice can draw inferences about activities occurring inside the structure's walls.").
1S9 See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Campisi, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The
Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 46 VILL. L. REV. 241, 245 (2001).
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outside of the house."' 6 ° It further found:
[T]he use of the thermal imaging device here was not an intrusion into Kyllo's home.
No intimate details of the home were observed, and there was no intrusion upon the
privacy of the individuals within the home. The device used cannot penetrate walls or
windows to reveal conversations or human activities. The device recorded only the
heat being emitted from the home.
161
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After he was indicted for manufacturing marijuana, Mr. Kyllo
filed a motion to suppress evidence, challenging the warrantless use
of the thermal imaging device, and requesting a 'Franks hearing' 162
regarding false statements made to the magistrate who issued the
search warrant. 63 The court agreed to hear evidence regarding false
statements made about Mr. Kyllo's electricity usage only. 6 4  The
court ruled that the magistrate judge was not deliberately or reck-
lessly misled by false statements or omissions when he issued the
warrant. 65  On the warrantless use of the thermal imaging device,
based on legal argument alone, the court denied Kyllo's motion to
suppress because "[n]o intimate details of the home were observed,
and there was no intrusion upon the privacy of the individuals within
the home.' 66
In its first opinion in this case, the Ninth Circuit vacated the dis-
trict court's ruling. 167  On the matter of the false and misleading
statements about Mr. Kyllo's power usage, the court held that the dis-
trict court's finding was not clearly erroneous as to whether they
were knowingly or recklessly made,'68 and the court ultimately af-
160 United States v. Kyllo, No. CR. 92-5 I-FR, 1996 WL 125594, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 15,
1996), aff'd, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
161 id.
162 See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 154 (1978) (holding that a defendant
can challenge a facially valid affidavit by making a substantial preliminary showing that an
affidavit contained intentionally or recklessly made false statements, and that purged of
those statements, there would not be sufficient support for a finding of probable cause).
163 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508).
164 id.
165 United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 791 (D. Or. 1992), aff'd in part, vacated
and remanded in part, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994).
166 Id. at 792.
167 United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994).
168 Id. at 529.
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firmed that finding.169 The court did, however, hold that the district
court had erred in denying Mr. Kyllo a Franks hearing on the matter
of whether false and misleading statements were made about his
marital status.1 7' The court held that Mr. Kyllo had shown that state-
ments about his marital status were false and it was possible that,
without those statements, the affidavit would not have been sufficient
to establish probable cause. 171  Unlike the statements about Mr.
Kyllo's power usage, clear proof was not required because the issue
was only whether an evidentiary hearing should be held.172 Also, in
regard to the use of the thermal imager, the case was remanded back
to the district court for "an evidentiary hearing on the intrusiveness of
the thermal imaging device."'' 73 The court stated that in order to de-
termine whether the warrantless use of a thermal imager violates the
Fourth Amendment, it would need "some factual basis for gauging
the intrusiveness of the thermal imaging device, which depends on
the quality and the degree of detail of information that it can
glean."'91
74
On remand, the district court based its analysis of the thermal
imager on the Katz test.7 5 After finding that the specific thermal
imager used only recorded the heat being emitted from the house and
was unable to reveal intimate details of the inside of the home, the
court held that "Kyllo did not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the heat emanating from his home."'7 6 The court also held
that the investigator had not deliberately or recklessly omitted facts
about Kyllo's marital status from the record.'77 The result was that
Kyllo's motion to suppress evidence was denied.'78
Kyllo appealed to the Ninth Circuit again and this time the court
reversed the district court's holding that a thermal image scan is not a
search under the Fourth Amendment.'79 Holding that Kyllo had a
19 Id. at 531.
170 Id. at 530.
171 id.
172 id.
171 Id. at 531.
174 Id. at 530.
175 United States v. Kyllo, No. CR. 92-51-FR, 1996 WL 125594, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 15,
1996), aff'd, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
176 Id. at *2.
177 Id. at *4.
171 Id. at *5.
179 United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th
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subjective expectation of privacy in the signature of the heat escaping
from his home'80 and finding that the expectation was one society
would acknowledge as reasonable, 8 ' the Ninth Circuit reversed the
lower court's ruling and held the warrantless use of the thermal
imager violated the Fourth Amendment." 2 In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the court added a substantial amount of its own factual findings
to the findings of the district court on the specific thermal scanner
used in the case.' 3 While the district court had limited its focus to
the scanner's ability to see through the exterior walls of a house,'84
the Ninth Circuit also considered what the scanner was capable of
when pointed at windows and used from long distances.'85 In re-
sponse to this line of argument, the dissent stated: "Whatever its Star
Wars capabilities, the thermal imaging device employed here in-
truded into nothing. Rather, it measured the heat emanating from and
on the outside of a house.'
86
The government petitioned for a rehearing."8 7 While that request was
pending, the author of the previous opinion retired.'88 A new judge
was selected for the panel over Mr. Kyllo's objections.8 9 That new
judge sided with the previously dissenting judge, creating a new
majority.'9 ° In the court's new opinion, the previously dissenting
judge reiterated that whatever capabilities the technology employed
here might have, the thermal imaging device used against Mr. Kyllo
intruded into nothing.' The court then performed an analysis based
on the Katz test.' 92 With regard to the first prong, the court held that
Mr. Kyllo had exhibited no subjective expectation of privacy in the
heat escaping from his home, because he had made no attempt to
conceal those emissions.'93 The court analogized the detection of
Cir. 1999).
180 See id. at 1252-54.
..1 Id. at 1255.
182 id.
"' See id. at 1254.
184 United States v. Kyllo, No. CR. 92-51-FR, 1996 WL 125594, at *2.
185 See United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1254.
186 Id. at 1255.




191 United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27
(2001).
'92 See id. at 1045.
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those emissions."' The court analogized the detection of heat ema-
nating from a home to the detection of odors emanating from lug-
gage, concluding that thermal detection is similar to a constitutionally
allowed "canine sniff."' 94 The court also held that because the tech-
nology did not reveal any intimate details of Mr. Kyllo's life, but in-
stead only "amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall" of
the house, it was not an invasion of privacy that society would deem
unreasonable.'95 The court further rejected Kyllo's argument that the
omission of information regarding his marital status invalidated the
warrant, upholding the district court's finding as not clearly errone-
ous that the omission was not done knowingly or recklessly.'96 Not
surprisingly, a dissenting opinion carried forward the reasoning of the
prior majority opinion."'
The defendant filed a petition for certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court'98 and the Court agreed to hear arguments on
whether a warrantless thermal scan of a residence violated the Fourth
Amendment."'
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court reversed the court of appeals,
with Justice Scalia writing for the majority.2 0 The Court began by
laying down the presumption that a warrantless search of a home is
unconstitutional; 0 ' the critical question was whether a search had oc-
curred." 2 The Court began its opinion by distinguishing this case
from the Ciraolo decision, which appeared to create the most obsta-
cles for the Court's decision.2 3 The Ciraolo decision held that police
'9' Id. at 1046.
194 See id.
I ld. at 1046-47.
96 Id. at 1047.
'9' See id. at 1047-51 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
'98 Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
199 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
200 In the majority opinion of Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), Justice Scalia
was joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
201 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
202 Id.
203 See id. at 32; see generally California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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could observe a house (despite its special protected status in Fourth
Amendment law) from a public area and that they did not need to
shield their eyes from observing something in which a person had not
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy.2"4 The Court distin-
guished this case from Ciraolo by arguing that this case involved
more than naked-eye surveillance, and that Ciraolo had "reserved
judgment as to how much technological enhancement" of the senses
would be too much for Fourth Amendment purposes.2"5 The Court
then signaled that, despite Ciraolo, an important factor in deciding
this case was the fact that the heat detected was in an area immedi-
ately adjacent to a home, which also distinguished it from Dow
Chemical."6 The Court recognized that while the Katz test has been
criticized as subjective and unpredictable, Fourth Amendment protec-
tion is at its highest when a search reveals activity taking place inside
a home."0 7 The Court then stated its holding: "We think that obtain-
ing by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the in-
terior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained with-
out physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area'
constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in ques-
tion is not in general public use.' 20 8 This holding appears to embrace
a new test for sense-enhancing technology, rather than an application
of the Katz test." 9 This new test would be a substantial change in
Fourth Amendment law.
The Court then anticipated the obvious objection to this hold-
ing-that the thermal detector measures heat emanating from the out-
side of the house, but does not reveal what is going on inside the
home.2"0 The Court analogized the use of a thermal scanner to pick
up heat emanating from a home to the use of a microphone to pick up
sound waves emanating from a phone booth and thereby defining it
as similar to the unconstitutional search that was conducted in
Katz."' The Court argued that to allow this technology based on the
204 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
205 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
206 See id. (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986)).
207 See id. at 34.
208 Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
209 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
210 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2.
211 Id. at 35.
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fact that it only measures heat on the outside of a house would leave
homeowners at the mercy of this technology as it becomes more so-
phisticated and provides police with more nuanced information about
what is going on behind the walls that the heat is coming from.
212
While the dissent argued that Fourth Amendment protections should
only be available to searches that reveal intimate details about the in-
side of the home,213 the majority took the position that when it comes
to the home, all details are intimate. 214  Furthermore, limiting
searches to only those that do not disclose intimate details does not
give homeowners or law enforcement officers a workable standard.215
According to the Court, even the crudest thermal detection technol-
ogy could provide law enforcement officers with intimate details
about what is going on inside the house (e.g., "what hour each night
the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath. .... ).26 The
Court concludes that a firm, bright line must be drawn at the entry of
the home, and "details of the home that would.., have been un-
knowable without physical intrusion" before the invention of the
technology in question are significant enough to warrant Fourth
Amendment protection.217
The Court drew its opinion to a close with an anomalous state-
ment-stating that it must construe the Amendment in light of its
original meaning in order to protect the interests and rights of indi-
viduals.21 8 It is difficult to tell what the Court meant by this remark
because it did not elaborate clearly on what it thought the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment was.2 19 As indicated above, it has
traditionally appeared that the Fourth Amendment was originally
only meant to protect against physical encroachment on the defen-
dant's property. The only attempt that the Court made to explain its
interpretation of the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment was
to offer a dictionary definition of the word "search" as used at the
time the Fourth Amendment was adopted.20 However, while the
211 See id. at 35-36.
213 Id. at 44 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
214 [d. at 37.
215 Id. at 38.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 40.
218 See id.
219 See id.
220 Id. at 32 n. I (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
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quoted definition did not necessarily contradict the Court's holding, it
did little to support it. The only examples the Court offered were
searches of physical tangible items, thereby potentially bolstering the
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment was only meant to protect
against physical searches. 2 '
The Court concluded by remanding the case back to the district
court to determine whether the search warrant would have been is-
sued if the thermal scan had not been conducted.222
B. DISSENTING OPINION
The dissent, written by Justice Stevens, was unimpressed with
the capabilities of the technology employed in this case.223 In the dis-
sent's view, this case merely involved the observation of something
outside of the home using a fairly crude technology.224 The dissent
argued that there is a difference between technology that gives its
user direct access to information in a private area and technology that
only allows its user to make inferences about what may be going on
inside that private area.225 Furthermore, the dissent argued, there is
no reason to craft a new rule.226 Old rules about what is allowed under
the Fourth Amendment are adequate to resolve this case: "'searches
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively un-
reasonable,' [b]ut... searches and seizures of property in plain view
are presumptively reasonable." '27 While the Court placed heavy em-
phasis on the fact that this investigative technique was directed at a
house, where Fourth Amendment protections are most stringent, the
dissent believed that this fact was irrelevant in this case because it is
well-established law that "what a person knowingly exposes to the
public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." '228
LANGUAGE 66 (6th ed. 1989) (1828)). See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
supra note 8, at 1200-01 (briefly discussing the 1789 Congressional debates surrounding the
ratification of the Fourth Amendment).
221 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n.1.
222 Id. at 40.
2213 See id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
224 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586
(1980)).
228 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986))
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The dissent took issue with the Court basing its decision on yet-
to-be-developed technology.229 The technology employed in this
case did not penetrate the walls of the house or obtain any informa-
tion regarding the inside of the house.23° Indeed, for the dissent, all
the technology had actually done was reveal something that was put
into the public domain that the police could probably detect through
the use of their ordinary senses anyway (e.g., by observing snow
melting at a faster rate on some parts of the house than others)."'
The unobtrusiveness of the technology involved was evidenced by
the Court's statement that, based on the thermal scan, the agents con-
cluded that the defendant was growing marijuana inside the house.232
According to the dissent, the fact that the agents "concluded" that
marijuana was growing inside, instead of actually knowing that mari-
juana was growing inside, shows the lack of detail about the interior
of the home that the technology provides. 33 The agents could have
incorrectly concluded that the lady of the house was taking her daily
sauna."' The only reason that they were able to correctly infer that
marijuana was growing inside was because of the other aspects of the
investigation that they had conducted, such as the subpoenaing of the
utility bills.23 In fact, the information that the agents gleaned from
the thermal scan was not any more intrusive than the information
gained from the subpoenaed utility records which also allowed the
investigating agent to infer what was going on inside Mr. Kyllo's
house.236
Following its discussion why it did not think that the technology
employed in this case was particularly threatening, the dissent then
implied that a balancing test would be appropriate in this case, stating
that the use of a mere "sense-enhancing technology" like the one
used here seems to be a reasonable public service when compared to
the trivial privacy interest that is threatened by its use.237 The privacy
(citation omitted).
229 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230 See id. at 42-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237 See id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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interest seemed particularly trivial to the dissent when compared to
the evil that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect against: the
physical entry of the home.238
After explaining its view of the technology involved in this case
and the Fourth Amendment, the dissent then took issue with the new
rule that the Court fashioned to resolve this case, criticizing it as be-
ing both too narrow and too broad.239 According to the dissent, the
Court's rule is too narrow because it bases the resolution on the wide-
spread nature of the technology employed.24 As the technology in
question becomes more widespread, the Fourth Amendment protec-
tion would decrease instead of increase.241 The dissent determined
that the Court's rule is too broad for three reasons. First, it prohibits
"mechanical substitutes" for "sense-enhancing technology" that have
already been approved by the Court, such as canine sniffs, and there
is no compelling reason to do that. 42 Second, the Court's rule ap-
pears to protect information simply because it emanated from the in-
side of a home, even if the information was detected outside of the
home.243 Third, the Court's new rule treats the mental process of
interpreting data gathered from the outside of the home as equivalent
to the physical search of the home's interior. 44
Finally, the dissent distinguished this case from Katz by pointing
out that the investigation in Katz allowed officers to listen to the con-
versation taking place in the booth, giving them the functional
equivalency of presence inside the booth.24 The dissent argued that,
for the equivalent to have happened here, the thermal scanner would
have not only had to tell its user that heat was being generated inside
the house, but also what was generating the heat. 46 What the tech-
nology employed here actually provided would have been equivalent
to a technology telling the police how loud Katz's conversations
were, but not what he was saying.247
238 /d. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).239 Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240 See id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244 Id. at 49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
246 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 49-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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V. ANALYSIS
The Court incorrectly suppressed evidence in Kyllo v. United
States245 because it based its resolution of the case on capabilities that
the technology used against Mr. Kyllo did not actually have and be-
cause the rule that the Court fashioned to resolve the case is built
upon facts that are likely to change.249 This weakness in the Court's
rule perpetuates the problem presented by technological advances to
Fourth Amendment protections-which is that these inevitable ad-
vances constantly change the capabilities of law enforcement offi-
cers. 2 " The Fourth Amendment has proven itself to be particularly
susceptible to technological advancement as new technologies allow
law enforcement officers to conduct investigations that would not
have been possible at the time of the Amendment's adoption."' The
Supreme Court's history on this issue has, if anything, confused the
matter further as the standards for Fourth Amendment analysis have
changed212 and the Court has arrived at different conclusions in cases
involving similar fact patterns. 253 The Court has done little to allevi-
ate the confusion with this decision; it has prohibited, without expla-
nation, an investigation that was significantly less intrusive than ones
that it has upheld in the past.254 With this case, the Court missed an
opportunity to clarify its stance on the Fourth Amendment, to protect
the rights of citizens, to allow law enforcement officers to keep pace
with the advancing technologies of criminals, and to create a rule that
would not need constant revisitation by the courts as technology ad-
vances.
A. THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
One of the more confusing aspects of the Court's opinion is to
what extent it bases its conclusion on the original intent of the Fourth
Amendment. In one sentence near the end of its opinion, the Court
248 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
249 See id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250 See Daniel J. Polatsek, Thermal Imaging and the Fourth Amendment: Pushing the
Katz Test Towards Terminal Velocity, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 453, 463
(1995).
251 See id.
252 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
253 Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984), with United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
254 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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states that the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment compels its
conclusion.255 Given the likelihood that the fact pattern presented in
this case is far beyond anything the drafters of the Fourth Amend-
ment thought was possible, it is unfortunate that the Court makes lit-
tle effort to explain how its analysis is based on the original meaning
of the Amendment. The small effort that it does make is to offer the
following definition of the term "search" as used at the time the
Fourth Amendment was adopted: "'[t]o look over or through for the
purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection;
as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief"' 256
This definition hardly provides support for the notion that the passive
detection of heat coming off of the outside of a building qualifies as a
search, as the examples that it offers only refer to searching physical
properties for tangible items.2"7 If anything, it detracts from the
Court's conclusion.258
The dissent takes issue with the Court's statement, indicating
that the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment compels the dis-
sent's conclusion, by providing its own explanation of what the
Fourth Amendment was meant to guard against: physical entry of a
homey.2 9 The dissent's characterization of the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment appears to be the more accurate one. 26' As evi-
denced by the Court's own history, the earliest understanding of the
Fourth Amendment in light of challenges to it by technological ad-
vances was that it only protected against physical invasions of private
property.2 6' That form of analysis changed with the Katz decision
(which, notably, included a dissent from Justice Black arguing that
the movement away from basing Fourth Amendment protections on
physical intrusions violated the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment). 62 However, since Katz, the Court has only declared
255 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
256 Id. at 32 n.1 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 66 (6th ed. 1989)(1828)). See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
supra note 8, at 1200-01 (briefly discussing the 1789 Congressional debates surrounding the
ratification of the Fourth Amendment).
257 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n.1.
258 See id.
259 Id. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
262 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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conduct that did not involve physical encroachment as being uncon-
stitutional one time in United States v. Karo.263 Except for Katz and
Karo, the Court has a long history of allowing government investiga-
tions that did not involve physical invasions of private property.2 64
This does not necessarily mean that all investigations that do not
physically invade private property should be allowed.265 It is only
meant to point out the absurdity of basing a holding on the premise
that a non-physical search of property violates the original meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 66
The idea that the Fourth Amendment was originally meant to
prohibit only physical searches can be found outside of the Court's
own history as well.267 The wording of the Amendment raises doubts
about the Court's argument in that it only protects people's right "to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects .... "268 The
wording only refers to tangible items2 69 and any ambiguity in support
of the Court's view (to the effect that it only protects against physical
searches) is further diminished by the history leading up to its adop-
tion.2" The Fourth Amendment was written in response to the hated
'writs of assistance' employed against the colonists by the British.7 1
The writs allowed their bearers to conduct physical searches of a
household, virtually without limit (even by time).272 Furthermore, in
his dissent to the Katz opinion, Justice Black contends that eaves-
dropping was common and the failure of the Fourth Amendment's
drafters to outlaw this indicates that they did not have any great con-
263 468 U.S. 705 (1984). See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) ("The
observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took place within public navigable
airspace in a physically nonintrusive manner .. ") (citation omitted); Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
264 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
265 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
266 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting).
267 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 8, at 1199; see also Zabel, supra
note 11.
268 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
269 Katz, 389 U.S. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting).
270 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 8, at 1199-1201; Zabel, supra
note 11.
271 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 8, at 1199; see also Zabel, supra
note 11, at 271.
272 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCI SERVICE, supra note 8, at 1200.
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cem about non-physical invasions of a person's property. 273
All this is not meant to say that the Court would necessarily be
wrong in extending Fourth Amendment protections beyond physical
violations-only that it should take one of two possible roads to do
so. Either it should be honest that it is extending the Fourth Amend-
ment beyond its original understanding274 or it should only prohibit
investigations that involve a physical invasion (or the equivalent of a
physical invasion) into a constitutionally protected area.27 In this
case, the Court has chosen neither of these options. Without explana-
tion, the Court has claimed to base its conclusion on the Fourth
Amendment, even though that conclusion has little support in either
the Court's own historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment's
protections or the history of the adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment.76 The Court also failed to consider whether the information
gathered by the technology used in this case could have been gath-
ered without physical invasion before the technology was invented.277
The only knowledge that the thermal detector used in the present case
gave investigators was that the outside of the house was unusually
warm and, according to the fact finding court, this was all the thermal
detector was capable of.27 However, it was possible to tell that the
outside of a building was warm before the invention of thermal detec-
tors (e.g., by noticing that snow is melting faster on some parts than
on others).279
In sum, the Court has extended the Fourth Amendment to pro-
hibit activity that its original understanding would not have prohib-
ited and it has done this despite the fact that its holding is at odds
with the Court's own history. The Court's claim that it is basing its
decision on the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment deserves
significantly more explanation than the Court has given it.
273 Katz, 389 U.S. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting).
274 See id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
275 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 46 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
276 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
277 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting) (pointing out that eavesdropping was
commonly done at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted). Arguably, eavesdropping
reveals more intimate information than a thermal detector.
278 United States v. Kyllo, No. CR. 92-51-FR, 1996 WL 125594, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 15,
1996), aff'd, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
279 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. THE UNRESOLVED DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING THE KATZ TEST
The Katz test has proven to be a difficult test to apply. Since its
creation, it has "been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and
unpredictable.""28 The Court's own application of this test has con-
tributed to the confusion surrounding what the Fourth Amendment
does and does not protect.28' Whate'ver the status of the debate over-
all, applying the Katz test to the fact pattern presented in this case
would lead to a particularly unsatisfying result.282 Perhaps that is
why the Court appears to have avoided doing so in Kyllo.8 3 Instead
of relying on the two-pronged approach outlined in Harlan's concur-
rence in the Katz test,284 which the Court had done in every Fourth
Amendment case involving the use of technology since it had been
announced,285 the Court based its conclusion on the fact that this case
involved the thermal scanning of a home and that the technology
used was not widespread.286 While the Court should be applauded for
abandoning the Katz test and avoiding the unsatisfying result that it
would have produced, the Court still missed an opportunity to pro-
vide those on both sides of government investigations with a clear
rule that would be easy to apply as different technologies become
available.
The problem with applying the Katz test to the fact pattern in this
case comes with the first prong of the two-prong test. In order for a
person to be protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Katz test indi-
cates that he must manifest a subjective expectation of privacy. 27
The practical effect of this rule is that a defendant must have under-
taken a substantial, outwardly visible effort to indicate that he meant
280 Id. at 34.
281 See supra text accompanying notes 102-125 (discussion of Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986)). Compare also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), with
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
282 See Susan Moore, Note, Does Heat Emanate Beyond the Threshold?. Hlome Infrared
Emissions, Remote Sensing, and the Fourth Amendment Threshold, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
803, 841 (1994).
283 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
284 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
285 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
286 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
287 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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for his activity to be private."' In Katz, the fact that the defendant
had entered a phone booth and closed the door behind him was suffi-
cient to meet this requirement. 89 However, in this case, the laws of
thermodynamics would seem to render it impossible for anyone to
satisfy this prong of the Katz test.29 In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit
did apply the Katz test and held that, because Mr. Kyllo took no af-
firmative action to conceal the heat emanating from his home, he had
not manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. 9' Other circuit
courts have upheld scanning of escaping heat because of its similarity
to searching through discarded garbage (which was approved of in
California v. Greenwood) since it indicated that the defendant did not
have a subjective expectation of privacy in it. 92 The problem with
these arguments is that, unlike garbage, it is impossible to prevent
heat from leaving a home when the air surrounding it is cooler than
the interior of the house.293 The laws of thermodynamics dictate that,
while insulation can slow the process down, heat inevitably dissi-
pates. 94 This means that the only way Mr. Kyllo could have passed
the first prong of the Katz test was if he had "incorrectly but sincerely
believed" that he could do something to prevent the excess heat from
leaving his house.295
Some have also argued that a thermal scan is similar to the
288 See, e.g., Dow Chent. Co., 476 U.S. at 241 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) "Dow appears to have done everything commercially feasible to protect the con-
fidential business information and property located within the borders of the facility." Id. Yet
this was not enough to satisfy the Katz test.
A pattern has developed in these cases. Where the defendant has failed to meet the first prong of
the Katz test, the courts have held that even if the defendant could have established a subjective
expectation of privacy, such expectation would not be one that society was prepared to recognize
as reasonable. As such, the defendant would fail to satisfy the second prong of the Katz test as
well.
Gregory L. Kelley, Comment, The Warrantless Use of Thermal Imagery, 12 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 597, 602 (1995) (citation omitted).
289 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
290 Huskins, supra note 158, at 663.
291 United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (Nooning, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
292 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); see also United States v. Penny-
Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991).
293 Huskins, supra note 158, at 663.
294 id.
295 Id. at 669.
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Court-approved "canine sniff' of luggage. 296 Like a dog's nose, the
thermal scanner merely heightens one of the senses of the investigat-
ing officers.297 However, critics of this analogy point out that unlike
a dog sniff, a thermal imager reveals all heat emanating from a home,
whether that heat is being produced by legal or illegal behavior.298 A
dog sniffing luggage will only tell officers whether there is illegal
contraband inside.299
Regardless of the weaknesses in the arguments already advanced
for allowing a thermal scan, based on the Court's history, it is clear
that Mr. Kyllo would not have prevailed if the Court had relied on the
Katz test. One gets the sense from reading over the Court's post-Katz
Fourth Amendment cases that, at least from the perspective of the
people claiming that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated,
the first prong of the Katz test has only a few small teeth to it.3"' In
Dow Chemical, the Court acknowledged that Dow had maintained
elaborate security around the perimeter of its facilities to prevent
people from viewing the very thing that the investigators were trying
to see. O' However, the Court's holding seemed to indicate that any-
thing short of preventing every possible investigation into the plant
would not be enough to satisfy the first prong of the Katz test.3 0 2 The
Court held that, despite all of Dow's efforts to keep people from see-
ing its plant, it still had not satisfied the first prong of the Katz test
because the plant could potentially be seen from an airplane, or it
could be viewed from a hill top.30 3 The Court made this decision de-
spite the substantial efforts that Dow took to prevent even the
unlikely scenarios that the Court came up with, even going so far as
to track down airplanes that it had observed flying overhead and con-
fiscating their film. 4
The lack of protection provided by the first prong of the Katz test
also came into question when the Court decided California v. Green-
296 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
297 See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226.
298 Brief for Petitioner at 33, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508).
299 Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
300 See Moore, supra note 282, at 831.
301 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
302 See id.
303 See id. at 234. The Court does not say whether there actually were hills surrounding
the plant, but considering the efforts that Dow undertook to keep people from seeing its
plant, it seems unlikely that it was located in a valley.
304 id. at 229, 242 n.3.
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wood.30 5 In that case, the Court held that the defendant had not satis-
fied the first prong of the Katz test because he had placed his garbage
outside-meaning that doing something as necessary as disposing of
one's garbage potentially waives one's right to Fourth Amendment
306protection.
After looking over the Court's history regarding the first prong
of the Katz test, we might start to wonder whether Mr. Kyllo could
have done anything to satisfy it. The answer would appear to be
no.37 The Court's holdings in Dow Chemical and other cases that
have employed the Katz test have consistently held that trying to
guard privacy is not enough. 3°" The defendant actually would have
had to succeed. However, the laws of thermodynamics indicate that
Mr. Kyllo could not have succeeded." 9 The question, then, is, if it is
not possible to satisfy a test, why have it in the first place? Further-
more, not only are the protections offered by the first prong of the
Katz test weak, but the Ninth Circuit's focus on the actions of Mr.
Kyllo seems to be a strange way of determining whether the actions
of the government agents were a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.31°
The good news is that, while the Court did mention the Katz test
in Kyllo and never indicated any problems with it, the Court never ac-
tually applied the Katz test. This is a strong indication of a departure
from the Court's previous Fourth Amendment decisions as the Court
has always relied on the Katz test to resolve similar issues.311 Instead,
the Court came up with a new two-prong test (although it never ex-
plicitly said that this is what it was doing).1 The new two-prong
test is for cases involving sense-enhancing technology. 313 The first
prong is to ask whether the technology reveals information regarding
the inside of a constitutionally protected area that, prior to the inven-
tion of the technology, could not have been gotten without physical
30 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
306 Id. at 40-41.
307 See Laba, supra note 57, at 1445.
308 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
309 Huskins, supra note 158, at 669.
310 See Zabel, supra note 11, at 288.
311 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207;
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276 (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
312 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
313 id.
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intrusion.314 The second prong is to ask whether the technology in
question is within general public use.315 While the Court should be
commended for not relying on the Katz test to resolve this case, this
new test that the Court has fashioned does little to deal with the sub-
jectiveness and unpredictability for which the Katz test has been criti-
cized.316 As the dissent points out, a judge will still need to make a
subjective determination of whether a challenged technology has per-
vaded the public use enough to no longer require a warrant.317 This
rule does nothing to increase predictability.31 In fact, it lessens it, as
technologies that require a warrant at one point will often cease to re-
quire one at other times as they become more widespread. More
problematic than that, only the Court will know when the use of a
once-prohibited technology becomes permissible.319 Furthermore,
the Court appears to have misapplied the first prong of its new test as
the technology employed here does not reveal anything that would
have previously required a physical invasion into a constitutionally
protected area.3 2  The dissent's proposed standard for evaluating
sense-enhancing technologies would have provided a much more
workable solution for those involved in government investigations
(on either side) and would not have required any adjustment as tech-
nology advances (as the Court's standard will).3 ' That proposed
standard is to only prohibit sense-enhancing technology when "it
provides its user with the functional equivalent of actual presence in
the area being searched. 322
C. THE PROBLEM WITH CONSIDERING POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGIES IN
RESOLVING FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES
There are many problems with basing the resolution of a Fourth
Amendment case on the capabilities of technology, either now or in
the future. The greatest difficulty in resolving challenges to Fourth
Amendment protections by new technology is the inevitability of
314 Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
315 id.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
318 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
319 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
320 Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
321 Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
322 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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technological change and advancement. 23 People routinely use tech-
nologies today that could not have been imagined by the Fourth
Amendment's drafters, and, 200 years from now, people will be us-
ing technologies that we cannot imagine. For this reason, it seems
like a good idea for the court to draw a bright line that cannot be
moved as technology advances.324 While the Court has drawn a
bright line with this decision, it has drawn it around the wrong thing.
Instead of attempting to draw a bright line around constitutionally
protected physical areas, as the Court did with the home in this case,
the Court should draw a bright line that separates more invasive tech-
nologies from less invasive ones."' For example, a thermal detector
that only gives vague information about the heat coming off of the
outside of a home might be allowed since, on its own, that would not
tell its user anything about what is going on inside the home. How-
ever, if thermal detectors develop to a point that they can give their
users accurate information about what is going on behind a wall (or,
the equivalent of actual, physical presence behind the wall), that
might be forbidden without a warrant.326 Based on different descrip-
tions of thermal detectors in academic literature, it appears that they
present a wide range of capabilities to their users.327 In this case, the
district court found that the thermal detector the officers used "cannot
and did not show any people or activity within the walls of the struc-
ture. '328 However, others state that some thermal detectors can detect
people behind windows, "or behind a wall where the wood is thin,"
and other details about what is going on inside a house.3 29 The Court
attempts to resolve the dispute by issuing a blanket prohibition on the
use of sense-enhancing technology that is not within the general pub-
323 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("For nearly 20 years, this Court has adhered to a standard
that ensured that Fourth Amendment rights would retain their vitality as technology ex-
panded the Government's capacity to commit unsuspected intrusions into private areas and
activities.").
324 See Huskins, supra note 158, at 677.
325 id.
326 id.
327 See, e.g., id. at 661; M. Annette Lanning, Note, Thermal Surveillance: Do Infrared
Eyes in the Sky Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1771, 1773-74
(1996).
328 United States v. Kyllo, No. CR. 92-51-FR, 1996 WL 125594, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 15,
1996), aff'd, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
329 Campisi, supra note 159, at 265.
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lic use.33° However, this is problematic, not only for the practical
reasons discussed below but also because it creates instability in the
law as the technology advances and the number of people using it in-
creases.33" ' Rather than trying to resolve the issue by arguing over
what the technology is and is not capable of, the Court should have
adopted the dissent's standard, which would have made the problem
presented by advancing technology moot.332
The dissent's proposed standard is to base the constitutionality of
sense-enhancing technology on its ability to give investigators the
functional equivalent of physical presence in a constitutionally pro-
tected area.333 In other words, did the thermal scanner used on Mr.
Kyllo's home reveal information which investigators could have only
otherwise gotten by standing inside of the home?334 Even the Court's
opinion does not indicate that it did.335 The Court bases its argument
that the thermal scanner gave investigators intimate details about
what was going on inside the home on the fact that it allowed them to
infer, based on knowing that there was a large amount of heat coming
off of the house, that marijuana was growing inside.336 However, the
fact that it had to be inferred indicates how little the thermal scanner
told investigators about what was going on inside the home.337 In-
deed, it was only because of the other investigation that the officers
had done that they correctly inferred that marijuana was growing in-
side the house.338 As the Court points out, the thermal detector may
allow investigators to determine at what hour each night the lady of
the house takes her daily sauna.339 However, this would only be true
if investigators already knew that there was a lady of the house, that
the house was equipped with a sauna, that the lady used the sauna on
a daily basis, and that there were no other sources of unusually high
amounts of heat in the house.34 Without all that information, none of
330 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
331 Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
332 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
333 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
334 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
331 Id. at 35.
336 Id. at 30.
337 Id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
338 United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27
(2001).
339 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).
340 See id. at 50-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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which the thermal imager could provide its user, the belief that the
lady of the house is taking her daily sauna is nothing more than a
guess.34'
Furthermore, the Court makes no effort to distinguish thermal
scans from other, constitutionally allowed investigative techniques
(one of which was undertaken in this very case).342 The quality of the
information provided by a thermal scan is no greater than the quality
of information provided by electricity bills. 343 Indeed, electricity bills
may give investigators an even clearer picture of what is going on in-
side the house that is consuming the electricity than they can get from
a thermal scan.344 Unlike a thermal scan, electricity bills can measure
with precision the amount of electricity being used by the house, and
it can provide information about the house at any time of day,
whereas a thermal scan must normally be conducted at night to pre-
vent the heat from the sun from interfering with it.345 As with a ther-
mal scan that shows a high amount of heat coming off of a house, an
electrical bill that shows a house uses an abnormally high amount of
electricity would be useless on its own.346 However, combined with
other information, it could give investigators a clearer picture of what
is going on inside the house.347 Furthermore, as with thermal scan-
ners, it is conceivable that the technology surrounding the measure-
ment of electricity usage will advance as well.348 One could imagine
a utility company wanting to provide its customers with a way to pin-
point which appliances are using the most electricity so that they can
gain greater control over their electricity usage.3 49 This information
could be used by an investigator to tell exactly what is happening in-
side the house." Why the Court should be concerned about the fu-
ture capability of thermal scanners when it has not been concerned
341 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
342 See id. at 30.
343 Douglas A. Kash, Prewarrant Thermal Imaging as a Fourth Amendment Violation: A
Supreme Court Question in the Making, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1295, 1306 (1997).
344 id,
345 Zabel, supra note 11, at 281.
346 Huskins, supra note 158, at 664.
347 Id.
348 See, e.g., Carlene Hempel, Coming: 1-ouses So Smart They Run Themselves, THE
NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 15, 2001 at D1; Roger Harris, Kitchen of the Fu-
ture Not Quite Ready, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, July 4, 2001.
349 See, e.g., Hempel, supra note 348; Harris, supra note 348.
350 See, e.g., Hempel, supra note 348; Harris, supra note 348.
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about the future capability of electric bills is not an obvious an-
swer.
351
In short, there are a number of problems with basing the resolu-
tion of constitutional issues on the capabilities of the technology in-
volved. By doing this, the Court has set itself up to have to revisit
this issue again at some point in the future. While the dissent's pro-
posed resolution to this case would draw a bright line indicating what
government investigators are and are not allowed to do, the Court
will likely be called on again to determine when this and other tech-
nologies have sufficiently entered the general use of society so as not
to require a warrant.52
D. THE CONSEQUENCES OF REQUIRING A WARRANT FOR A THERMAL
SCAN
There are practical consequences to the Court's decision for
those responsible for fighting crime as well. 353  Technology is not
only employed by those who investigate crime, but by those who
commit it as well.354 Illegal drug manufacturers have been some of
the most aggressive about employing technology to further their
trade. 55 Marijuana growers possess advanced technology, including
"'computerized irrigation systems, hydroponic basins, heating sys-
tems [and] growing lamps,' which allow for four full growing cycles
per year. 35 6 It seems safe to assume that, like thermal imaging tech-
nology, none of the indoor marijuana growing technology357 existed
at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.
Certainly, basing a decision on what to allow under the Fourth
Amendment from the technology criminals have available to them
351 There was never any question that the subpoenaing of Mr. Kyllo's utility bills without
a warrant was permissible. Mr. Kyllo only challenged that what he argued was a distorted
image of his electrical usage, which was presented to the magistrate who ultimately issued
the warrant. See United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1994).
352 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
353 See Huskins, supra note 158, at 686.
354 Zabel, supra note 11, at 279.
311 See, e.g., id.
356 Kash, supra note 343, at 1296 (quoting Mindy G. Wilson, Note, The Prewarrant Use
of Thermal Imagery: Has This Technological Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at
the Expense of Fourth Amendment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches?, 83 Ky. L.
J. 891, 892 (1995)).
357 See, e.g., Zabel, supra note 11, at 279 n.97.
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would be a dangerous idea.358 As the technologies that criminals use
become more sophisticated, our Fourth Amendment protections
would erode, which is exactly what the Court is trying to prevent. 59
However, it seems reasonable to weigh what would be required to
stop those criminals who engage in behaviors that were not formerly
possible against the protections that we would lose by allowing the
technology in question.36 As the dissent points out in Kyllo v. United
States, the interest being protected is in the heat coming off of the
outside of people's homes.36" ' This is generally not something that
most people who are not growing marijuana inside their house care
about.362 In contrast, the service that a thermal scan provides is ex-
tremely valuable.363 A scan of Mr. Kyllo's electrical bills on its own
would probably not have produced enough evidence to determine that
he was growing marijuana inside his house.364 Nor would a thermal
scan have revealed enough information. Yet, knowing that Mr. Kyllo
was consuming an abnormally high amount of electricity, which was
apparently being converted into heat, the government was able to cor-
rectly infer that Mr. Kyllo was running an indoor growing opera-
tion.365
There would be dangers in allowing the government to conduct
thermal scans without a warrant.366 It is easy to imagine that police
would be tempted to drive up and down streets, scanning houses,
looking for ones that were abnormally hot.367 However, there are a
number of practical considerations that would keep police officers
from doing this. Most important are the same ones that keep the po-
lice from randomly conducting any of the investigative techniques
that they are allowed to engage in without a warrant (e.g., searching
through trash, subpoenaing electrical records, conducting naked-eye
surveillance): time and money.36 Combine the fact that conducting a
358 See id. at 281.
9 See id.
360 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 45 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
361 Id. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
362 Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
363 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
364 See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999) (Nooning, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
361 Id. at 1044.
366 Huskins, supra note 158, at 690.
367 See id.
368 But see id.
[Vol. 93
KYLLO v. UNITED STATES
thermal scan takes time and costs money with the fact that, on its
own, a thermal scan tells its user almost nothing about what is going
on inside, a house-even when an unusual amount of heat is coming
off of it-and it is hard to identify any incentives that law enforce-
ment officers would have to do this.369
The Court should also have considered that having the police
conduct thermal scans before getting a warrant may help them avoid
the ultimate intrusion of a physical search, as it would allow them
one more check to confirm whether there is likely to be marijuana
growing inside.37°
The Court needs to consider that a thermal scan provides police
officers with information about crime that is becoming increasingly
difficult to obtain as criminals become more and more sophisti-
cated.371 The Court's blanket prohibition on this useful technology,
while perhaps going a long way towards protecting our Fourth
Amendment rights, makes it substantially more difficult for govern-
ment agents to detect crime-all to maintain privacy in something
that most people have very little interest in protecting.372 The dis-
sent's proposed standard would protect the rights that the Fourth
Amendment was meant to protect, while providing police officers
with a valuable weapon in fighting crime.373 Considering the sub-
stantial reasons to both employ this technology and to ban it entirely,
this question is one that legislators are better suited to deal with than
the courts.3 74 The courts should set a minimum standard to protect
our rights, such as the dissent's proposed "actual physical presence"
standard. If a legislature wants to raise that standard further, they
can. Also, if people decide it is more important to prevent marijuana
farms than it is to conceal the heat coming off of their houses, then
that is a decision they should be able to make.
369 But see id.
370 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984)
The monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full-
scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the Govern-
ment is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise obtained without a
warrant.
Id.
371 Zabel, supra note 11, at 279-80.
372 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 45 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
311 Id. at 45-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that the use of sense-
enhancing technology, which is not in use by the general public and
provides its user with information about the interior of a home that
would not have been previously possible without a physical intrusion,
is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.375 The
Court reasoned that when it comes to the home, Fourth Amendment
protections are heightened.376 The Court felt that while a thermal
scan does not provide a perfect snapshot of what is going on inside
the home, the fact that it provides any information about what is go-
ing on inside the home is enough to warrant its prohibition.377
The Court should be commended for breaking away from the
form of analysis that it has taken in Fourth Amendment cases for the
last thirty-four years (i.e., the Katz test). However, the new test that
the Court has employed here is not clearly better and suffers from
many of the same problems that the Katz test does. The Court should
not have taken into consideration the extent to which the technology
involved is used in society.378 It also should not have based its analy-
sis on what the technology used may be capable of.379 Instead, the
Court should have used this opportunity to draw a bright line that
would not fade or move over time. It should have based the constitu-
tionality of the use of technology on whether the technology provides
its user with the functional equivalent of presence in a constitution-
ally protected area.38
Daniel McKenzie
.. Id. at 34.
376 id.
317 Id. at 36-37.
378 Id. at 34.
379 id.
380 Id. at 47 (Stevens,. J., dissenting).
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